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Abstract 
 
This paper draws on the thinking of the French philosopher and biologist Henri Bergson, and attempts an 
understanding of the environment while considering Bergson’s metaphysics. Why is it that the bulk of 
the discussion concerning environmental problems takes place within a narrow framework that has 
difficulty recognizing the intrinsic value of nature? In this paper I try and explain Bergson’s description 
of the ways that consciousness seeks to know the world around it, and conclude that modern thought fails 
to recognize the sensual, sympathetic nature of experience. Only through understanding the ecology of 
our own thoughts can we hope to reach an understanding of the environment and how to live with it in a 
harmonious and ecologically conscious manner. 
 
 
 
 
“My desire for knowledge is intermittent, but my desire to bathe my head in atmospheres 
unknown to my feet is perennial and constant. The highest that we can attain to is not 
Knowledge, but Sympathy with Intelligence” –Henry David Thoreau1 
 
To try to examine the myriad of ecological problems such as pollution and climate 
change would be redundant, as most of us are already aware of the problems and their 
causes. In writing this paper, I wanted to avoid analyzing any one particular aspect of 
the relationship we have with our environment; in other words, I wished to diagnose the 
illness shaping our position towards the environment instead of reiterating its 
symptoms. The deeper I dug in trying to address our mistreatment of the biosphere in 
its totality, the more it was uncovered that at the core of the issue lay an ideological 
problem more than a social or political one. What appears puzzling is that despite the 
ever-growing amount of evidence linking our various lifestyle choices to ecological 
degradation, it seems impossible to practically deal with these choices on the scale 
necessary to effect change. Human beings existed with no major impact on the 
environment for hundreds of thousands of years. However, the past few millennia and 
especially the past few centuries have brought about technological changes that have 
given rise to an inherently destructive relationship; it is clear that we must radically re-
evaluate our entire human situation so as to be better attuned to the well-being of the 
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planet. For the most part the solutions offered are still largely delimited by the ways of 
thinking which got us into our current situation in the first place; the only two options 
being an attempt at lightly mitigating the consequences of climate change (such as 
driving a hybrid vehicle), or facing them with a resolute nihilism. 
 
Within the paradigm of life and values that we have constructed since the 
Enlightenment, it seems like we have lost the ability to have a meaningful relationship 
with our environment. It is not that the reigning worldview is opposed to such an 
emotive relationship, but rather that the modern attitude for dealing with virtually 
everything precludes even the possibility of such a relationship. For this paper I started 
by trying to choose an environmental ethic to defend, but soon realized that what I was 
after was not an elaboration on how we should treat the environment, but an 
understanding of how to even think about the environment. Do we regard natural 
processes in the way that the sciences do, with a hope to understand such processes in 
the same way we understand the workings of an automobile? Do we (almost arbitrarily) 
agree on an environmental ethic and judge our actions according to how they weigh on 
its moral scale? I suggest that the proper route to inhabiting the planet in a manner that 
is healthy for both human beings and the vast web of organisms that we live alongside 
begins unassumingly. Any ideology with which we approach our situation will already 
have imposed limits on possible solutions; in this manner, I am advocating an open and 
pragmatic beginning for our thinking. An open pragmatism grounded just as much in 
the subjective emotional experience as it is in the empirical rational one. In this work I 
will draw on the thinking of the French philosopher and biologist Henri Bergson and 
his description of the workings of our understanding in the hope to critically analyze 
conventional thinking, and begin to outline a route of ascension for the mountain of 
ecological problems we face. 
 
The foundation for Bergson’s thinking about life and consciousness rests on his 
metaphysical suppositions regarding the two fundamental ways in which philosophy 
seeks to know a thing. Moreover, these two fundamental ways of knowing are not 
unique to philosophy, they are in fact the pathways through which consciousness itself 
engages with the world around it: “-instinct and intelligence are two divergent 
developments of one and the same principle, which in the one case remains within 
itself, in the other steps out of itself and becomes absorbed in the utilization of inert 
matter”2. The first way of knowing is what Bergson describes as intellectual; the way 
that analyzes an object by moving around it, seeking to know it from the outside. This 
is contrasted with the experiential mode of intuition, which seeks to enter into a given 
object in a way that coincides with it; it is neither a synthesis nor an analysis of what is 
given, but an absolute account of the thing itself. Because of these two different 
perspectives through which consciousness understands the world, Bergson writes that, 
“The first kind of knowledge (intellectual) may be said to stop at the relative; the 
second (intuition), in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute”3. The 
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exterior mode of the intellect considers things spatially, and in this way only knows an 
object relative to other objects, judging and comparing from the outside. But such an 
understanding in terms of others is as far as one which rests purely on extension will 
allow. This way of knowing by means of comparison cannot be absolute; what the 
intellect seeks to understand can only be comprehended and this only by definition in 
relation to other things. Inversely, an act of intuition consists of an act of sympathy, in 
understanding something in and of itself without resorting to comparisons or analogies. 
Intuition is subjective inasmuch as it is the absolute account of a subject, in contrast 
with an objective account that takes stock of possible relations between objects (which 
are objects insofar as we are ignoring their interiority). 
 
Bergson asks us to consider an analogy which functions to represent the two different 
approaches which consciousness takes in understanding its environment. The example 
consists of constructing a poem when one is only given its scrambled letters. If these 
letters were component parts of the poem, one might have a chance of restructuring the 
original through intellectual engagement by guessing at the arrangement of the parts. In 
this case the meanings of the parts are not altered by their order, and we only arrive at 
an arrangement that is nothing more than the sum of its parts. The problem however is 
that these letters are not component parts, they are partial expressions of the poem 
which, taken outside of the context and feeling which the poem invites, are meaningless 
by themselves4. If one knew the poem, one could indeed place all of the letters in the 
correct order so as to reconstitute the poem, while the inverse operation is simply 
impossible. It is in this way that Bergson argues that it is possible to pass from intuition 
to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition5. Even when we attempt to stumble upon 
the poem by arrangements of its letters, we first must form an intuition of what we wish 
to represent, and arrange the fragments accordingly. From this intuition of the poem’s 
possible meanings we mistakenly try to rebuild it, not realizing that what the poem 
expresses is not immanent in its construction: “The very idea of reconstituting a thing 
by operations practiced on symbolic elements alone implies such an absurdity that it 
would never occur to anyone if they recollected that they were not dealing with 
fragments of the thing, but only, as it were, with fragments of its symbol”6 (Italics 
mine). In other words, the poem consists in more than a random arrangement of letters; 
it has its own interiority for which the arrangement of its letters is a skeleton that bears 
the vitality of its meaning. 
The analytic mode of the intellect necessarily deals with symbolizations and 
representations of things, as the intellect is concerned with action. The clear and distinct 
outlines of spatial things that we perceive are merely revelations of opportunities to act 
on them. In proportion to the action that consciousness is capable of, it separates and 
represents to itself what it experiences as symbols. The capability for consciousness to 
interact with the world around it then rests on its ability to consider things in their 
exteriority and relative to other things; in this way “intelligence… even in its humblest 
form, already aims at getting matter to act on matter…The more consciousness is 
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intellectualized, the more is matter spatialized”7. Intelligence is molded in the likeness 
of objects and it is only in this capacity that it is able to understand and act on them. 
Bergson equates the successes of positive science with successes of the intellect; the 
facts and clear demarcations that scientific analysis takes for granted are merely 
reflections of the intellect itself. One cannot describe intellect without implying the 
geometrical and repeatable relations that the intellect perceives; we think that our rules 
of logic are universal because in fact they are elaborations of the mechanisms of 
thought that allow us to perceive the universe in the first place. 
 
There is no denying the wealth of knowledge that these mechanistic investigations have 
uncovered, but such investigations can only exist within their own clinical vacuum. 
They exist precisely because they only take into account certain relative aspects of 
existence, and leave alone those aspects that cannot be accounted for by anything other 
than themselves. The rapid development of science and technology has rested on this 
intellectual paradigm, and as the fruits of its labors have increasingly nourished modern 
life, its scope has widened to include all aspects of our existence. Bergson’s philosophy 
is important precisely because it seeks a more holistic understanding than the intellect 
can provide; and it is in this holistic manner that I believe we can be better equipped to 
establish a balanced relationship with our environment once again. But how exactly 
will an understanding of both intellect and intuition guide us towards an ecologically 
conscious way of life? Will our understanding of ecology be one that is fully graspable 
by means of simple and relative concepts? 
 
Bergson writes that the natural inclination of the human mind is to seek clear concepts 
which it can grab a hold of, this being exactly the impetus driving scientific 
investigation. In fact, to attempt the sort of intellectual sympathy that he describes as 
intuition, “the mind has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the 
operation by which it habitually thinks”8. In other words, the mind must cease to focus 
on its external perception of itself as an object and enter back into the dynamism which 
constitutes its lived duration. It must step back into itself and recognize the intrinsic 
value in and of itself; value not relative to what lies outside of it. The mind is not made 
up of the static and graspable concepts with which the intellect is used to dealing, but 
exists continually experiencing novel situations. In the same way that we can describe 
the path of a projectile by the points through which it passes, we can describe the mind 
by the ideas and concepts which pass through it. We cannot however describe the 
projectile’s dynamic motion itself with static descriptions of points any more than we 
can describe the vital impulse of the mind by a description of states of mind. Intuition 
cannot be concerned with practical action because it has no practical objects that it can 
manipulate. It follows then that Bergson’s notion of truth is one where applicability is 
synonymous with clarity: “The clearness of a concept being scarcely more at bottom 
than the certainty, at last obtained, of manipulating the concept profitably”9. The 
problem is that if we rest our conception of the cosmos on a model that only sees the 
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value of things in their manipulability and use, we preclude the possibility that they can 
have value by themselves. 
 
As has been suggested earlier, what characterizes the intellect is its utter inability to 
grasp the passage of time apart from symbolizations and analogies; in a word the 
intellect is unmoving. It tries to grasp the creative progression of the cosmos in terms of 
fixed concepts, but does not find truth as it attempts to perfectly replicate actuality with 
those concepts. Bergson is not interested in defining what truth is; his task is seeking a 
sympathetic understanding of lived experience. For him this lived experience is 
comparable to the creative passage of the cosmos, ceaselessly experiencing new 
situations with facts rooted only in the past and the future still undetermined. It follows 
then that the clockwork universe of the intellect does somewhat mimic reality but is 
only a still-life of it, and what is real is not any fixed universal law, but the dynamic 
nature of existence itself: “Reality flows; we flow with it; and we call true any 
affirmation which, in guiding us through moving reality, gives us a grip on it and places 
us under more favorable conditions for acting”10. Bergson’s process-based ontology 
stresses the change that is inherent in experience, and works to dethrone the reigning 
notion that truth is eternal. His notion of intuition breaks free from the rigidity of 
concepts and places itself within the change that is inherent in existence. In embracing 
change, intuition allows for a creative freedom that is unknown to the intellect, and 
consequently invites an understanding of nature that is more alive than a purely 
mechanistic conception will allow. 
 
It is on this foundation of accounting for life and giving credit to the lived experience 
that we can begin to construct an ethics that is ecological in the fullest sense of the 
word. Bergson’s Philosophy is not a return to naïve animism, but an opportunity to 
reestablish the aliveness of nature and give it an equal voice in the current 
environmental debate. It is a reminder that we cannot approach the value of the 
environment with purely intellectual ends in mind. We should leave our cold and 
disenchanted epistemology behind to reify the living, breathing web of life that is the 
environment. Such a perspective would draw little distinction between the vital impulse 
of nature and our own, and indeed eliminate many of the bifurcations of understanding 
which have contributed to the ecological crisis in general:  “What was immobile and 
frozen in our perception is warmed and set in motion. Everything comes to life around 
us, everything is revivified in us”11. 
 
 Our current approach to ecology seems too geared towards the nature’s manipulation 
and use, instead of geared towards a way of life that we know would be more 
sustainable than most modern western lifestyles. Bergson’s vision of the future is one 
that does not see the entirety of reality as fitting into wholly determined concepts, and 
sees pragmatic suggestions as fluid, capable of adapting through duration to meet 
whatever obstacles may present themselves. His idea of mutability, however, is one that 
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is quite different from the mutability of technology. Bergson’s epistemology describes 
the acquisition of knowledge not as the discovery of truths about reality, but as the 
invention of such truths12. In this way, Bergson does not place truth completely outside 
of what we are able to grasp a hold of in the flux of reality, but does not see it as being 
ever completely caught within our grasp either. In taking an approach to addressing 
environmental problems, a pragmatic approach would guide us by both the empirical 
and the ideal. The empirical can direct and mentor us through the relationships that we 
can prove exist within the environment, and the ideal can help shape our aspirations of 
the sustainable society towards which we strive. While the empirical rests on the past, 
by taking change and creativity into account the ideal opens us to the future, and gives 
us a firmer grasp on reality: “Apart from the truths which translate mere sensations, it 
is, according to pragmatism, the truths of feeling which would push their roots deepest 
into reality”13. The intuition that sympathizes and sensuously experiences the world has 
a wider scope, and affords us a broader perspective on our environment than the 
intellect does. Such an intuitive approach to ecology would evaluate our lifestyles from 
a point of view which sees our connection to the environment as fundamental, and for 
the most part would have a radically different set of values than those currently 
practiced in the industrial world.  
 
For the most part, the pillars of our industrial society are expressions of the intellect 
which have proven profitable enough to become institutionalized. What are these 
pillars? Most political and economic systems in place today function purely in terms of 
what they are able to manipulate and have control over. Technology likewise attempts a 
mastery over nature so as to direct it towards whatever ends we see as useful. Such 
systems seem to have the common denominator of a particular conception of nature that 
refuses to recognize its vital impulse, deafening our ears to the gasps of our expiring 
environment. I suggest that there is an entire family of systems, an entire framework of 
thinking, which given its lack of holistic perspective, does not see any intrinsic value in 
the environment. Such is the limited sort of thinking that seems to be leading us 
towards environmental disaster, and blindly perpetuating our value systems in a narrow 
and rigid framework. The directions that holistic thinking points us may at first seem 
radical, but only because we are so deeply entrenched in our current ways of life. I 
would like to re-invite intuitive understanding back into the debate about environmental 
problems, so that we can increasingly sympathize with nature to shed light on new 
societal paradigms. It is clear that maintaining the status quo concerning our treatment 
of the earth is simply not an option, and that we must be both imaginative and grounded 
as we begin to tackle environmental problems. I firmly believe that if we learn to 
harness our intuition and ground it pragmatically, we can build an ecological 
understanding that will lead us towards a future we can sustain. 
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